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1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been a surge of interest in artificial intelligence models 
of creativity. Both AAAI-91 [18] and IJCAI-91 [19] hosted workshops on 
creativity; a Spring Symposium on Creativity was held in 1993 [17]. With this 
increased interest comes a need for foundational literature-literature that can 
guide the emerging interest by providing a common foundation for discussion and 
criticism. This need is particularly great for creativity because people lack a solid, 
intuitive notion of what it means to “be creative”. In most AI domains, 
researchers at least share a common notion about what they are trying to achieve. 
Not so with creativity; the discussion more often centers around what creativity is 
rather than how it is accomplished. 
In this context The Creative Mind is a timely addition to the field. Not only is it 
the first book to address issues in creativity in light of recent developments in both 
artificial intelligence and psychology, but it also examines a wide variety of topics. 
The book reviews recent theories in psychology that bear on the issue of 
creativity, catalogues and reviews important work in artificial intelligence models 
of creativity, and addresses a number of philosophical questions about the nature 
of creativity in man and machine. Most importantly to this review, The Creative 
Mind makes a serious, disciplined attempt to define what it means to be creative. 
There is much to enjoy in The Creative Mind. Because of its wide scope and the 
intriguing nature of its topic, The Creative Mind is the kind of book that raises 
many questions. All of these questions deserve further commentary, but given the 
limited space, I have chosen to focus on a single issue that underlies the entire 
book: the definition of creativity. Boden’s approach to this fundamental question 
sets the tone and direction of The Creative Mind, and understanding this issue is 
critical to evaluating this book. 
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2. What is creativity? 
What does it mean to be creative‘? The traditional view of creativity is that a 
creative idea has both fundamental novelty and usefulness [6, 11, 131. Fundamen- 
tal novelty means that a creative idea must in some meaningful way be different 
from all previous ideas, as taken either in the context of the creator (egocentric 
creativity, which Boden calls P-creativity) or in the context of all of history 
(historical creativity, which Boden calls H-creativity). Usefulness means that the 
idea must fulfill some need or purpose. 
We can use this definition to recognize, for example, that painting a copy of the 
Mona Lisa with a red dress instead of a blue dress is not creative, because the 
copy lacks any meaningful difference from the original. Of course, human 
intelligence is required to recognize when a difference is meaningful. If the ersatz 
Mona Lisa was intended as an advertising gimmick for a new line of women’s 
clothing with the subtitle “Doesn’t her smile seem a little wider?“, we might well 
call it creative, because we can now recognize that in the context of advertising 
women’s clothing, the difference is both meaningful, novel and useful. 
Boden, however. finds this definition of creativity inadequate. Her difficulty is 
that it does not distinguish creativity from mere novelty. As Boden puts it in 
Chapter 3: 
To be creative. it is not enough for an idea to be unusual-not even if it is 
valuable, too. Nor is it enough for it to be a mere novelty, something which 
has never happened before. Genuinely creative ideas are surprising in a 
deeper way. [p. 301 
How does Boden define creativity? Although Boden does not provide an 
explicit definition, we can trace the progression of a definition in several passages 
from Chapter 3: 
Our surprise at a creative idea recognizes that the world has turned out 
differently not just from the way we thought it would, but even from the way 
we thought it could. [p. 311 
The definition begins with Boden noting that creativity often has an emotional 
surprise or “Aha!” aspect. This, she says, is due to more than mere statistical 
unlikeliness. Creative ideas are surprising not because they violate our expecta- 
tions of how things might be, but because they violate our expectations of how 
things could be. Boden is distinguishing ideas which are conceivable but unlikely 
from ideas which are inconceivable. Only the latter qualify as creative. 
To explain what is meant by an inconceivable idea and how it can become 
conceivable, Boden likens intelligence to a generative system. A person’s 
intelligence-his conceptual maps, cognitive processes, knowledge, etc.-is a 
conceptual system which is capable of generating a certain space of ideas. This 
space represents what things “could” be. Creativity occurs when the person 
changes his conceptual system so that he is now capable of generating ideas which 
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were not in his previous idea space. These new ideas violate his old expectations 
of what could be, and this is the source of creativity’s “deep surprise”: 
We can now distinguish first-time novelty from radical originality. A merely 
novel idea is one which can be described and/or produced by the same set of 
generative rules as are other, familiar ideas. A genuinely original, or 
creative, idea is one which cannot. [p. 401 
Creativity is the process of producing a new conceptual system: 
By creative mathematics . . . I mean producing new generative systems, new 
styles of doing mathematics. [p. 451 
Creativity, then, is the act of changing one’s conceptual system to produce 
thoughts which could not have been produced by the previous system. 
As an example of this process, Boden describes Kekule’s discovery of the ring 
structure of benzene. Before Kekule’s discovery, organic molecules were believed 
to be linear (branching) strings of atoms. Kekule discovered that an organic 
molecule might also take the form of a ring. To put this in Boden’s terms, we can 
say that before Kekule’s discovery, Kekule’s conceptual system for organic 
molecules could produce only linear molecules, while afterwards his conceptual 
system also included the idea of ring-shaped molecules. KekulC had to discard his 
old conceptual system in favor of a new one which contained a previously 
impossible concept: ring-shaped organic molecules. This production of a new 
conceptual system is what made Kekule’s act creative. 
3. Discussion 
The underlying thesis of The Creative Mind is that creativity results from 
changing one’s conceptual system to produce new thoughts which were impossible 
under the old conceptual system. Is this a useful definition of creativity? 
3.1. Correctness 
The first question we can pose about this definition is whether or not it is 
correct, at least in the sense of whether or not it captures our strongest intuitions 
about creativity. And if our intuitions about creativity aren’t definite, we can at 
least compare this definition to examples of creativity, as Boden did with the 
KekulC anecdote. 
The immediate answer is that by Boden’s definition, many acts which we are 
inclined to view as creative are not. For example, Boden quotes Dickens 
describing Ebenezer Scrooge as “a squeezing, wrenching, grasping, scraping, 
clutching covetous old sinner”. It seems reasonable to say that Dickens’ surprising 
use of a long string of adjectives was creative. Certainly it is both novel and 
useful. But by Boden’s definition Dickens is not being creative, because his idea is 
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easily expressed by his existing conceptual system for English. Indeed, Boden 
immediately comments: 
(Strictly, this literary conceit does not fit the strong definition of creativity 
given in Chapter 3. Dickens was exploring grammar, but not transforming it. 
However, although sevenfold strings of adjectives could have occurred 
before, many readers had not realized the possibility. Dickens showed that 
there are more things in grammatical space than were normally dreamed of in 
their philosophy.) [p. 491 
Many readers will object to the implication that English grammar is a generative 
theory of language use. But Boden’s intention here is not to claim that grammar is 
a generative theory of language, but rather to recognize that English grammar in 
some way defines the limits of Dickens’ generative system. “Strict” creativity by 
Boden’s definition would involve breaking out of these limits. But as this example 
shows, we recognize Dickens’ description of Scrooge as creative even though it 
does not transcend his generative system. 
Similarly, consider this story about my niece from [12]: 
One day, while visiting her grandparents. Janelle was seated alone at the 
dining room table, drinking milk and eating cookies. Reaching for the 
cookies, she accidently spilled her milk on the table. She decided to clean up 
the mess herself. 
Janelle went into the kitchen, but there were no towels or paper towels 
available. She stood for a moment in the center of the kitchen thinking, and 
then she went out the back door. 
She returned a few minutes later carrying a kitten. The neighbor’s cat had 
given birth to a litter about a month ago, and Janelle had been over to play 
with the kittens the previous day. Janelle brought the kitten into the dining 
room, where he happily lapped up the spilled milk. 
Readers of this story are inclined to say that Janelle was creative in her solution 
to the “spilled milk” problem. And yet by Boden’s definition, Janelle was not 
creative. because surely she already knew about kittens, milk, and agents. 
Janelles solution to the spilled milk problem did not require her to invent 
something she couldn’t have before; only to invent something that she hadn’t 
before. 
Why do we consider these examples creative? The answer seems to be that 
these examples involve problem solutions that violate our expectations about 
where in our problem space we are likely to find useful solutions. We learn early 
that using many adjectives to modify a noun is awkward. It comes as a surprise 
when Dickens reveals that beyond this zone of “useless” solutions there is a 
useful solution. Similarly, experience with young animals quickly teaches that 
they are poor agents. Hence it is surprising when Janelle finds a useful solution 
involving a kitten as an agent. 
Boden’s definition does not include this “unexpected solution” type of creativi- 
ty. If we accept the Dickens and Janelle examples as creative (as even Boden is 
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inclined to do), then at best we can say that Boden’s definition of creativity is 
incomplete. Since the analysis in The Creative Mind assumes that creativity only 
arises from conceptual remapping, this leaves much of the book on shaky ground. 
3.2. Plausibility 
A second level on which we can examine Boden’s definition of creativity is 
psychological plausibility. Is there reason to believe that creativity in humans is 
based on the remapping of conceptual spaces? The primary psychological 
evidence Boden presents to support this thesis is a series of experiments by 
Karmiloff-Smith concerning the drawing abilities of young children [5]. These 
studies indicate that children possess conceptual maps of their knowledge which 
they can alter only in limited ways. Leaps in performance correspond to the 
remapping of knowledge into different, better conceptual structures. This hypoth- 
esis is referred to as the Representational Redescription Hypothesis, or RRH. 
But although this research suggests that people (or at least small children, a 
possibly pertinent distinction) have conceptual maps and the ability to change 
their maps, Boden presents no psychological evidence to suggest that creativity 
involves such remapping. The RRH is relatively new and not intended by 
Karmiloff-Smith to explain creativity, so direct psychological evidence testing the 
relevance of the RRH to creativity does not exist. 
However, creativity has been studied by psychologists for many years. A theory 
of creativity similar to Boden’s theory, the Gestalt hypothesis, has been studied 
and tested in many ways. The results of those studies can help us understand 
Boden’s theory. 
The Gestalt hypothesis explains the creative experience as being similar to 
perceptual restructuring [14,16]. Perceptual restructuring occurs when one’s 
perception of something spontaneously undergoes a radical shift. An example of 
this occurs with the Necker cube (see Fig. 1) which when steadily viewed will 
suddenly reverse itself and flip inside out. The Gestalt psychologists theorized that 
under certain circumstances a problem situation might undergo a similar sudden 
restructuring. This restructuring then leads smoothly and easily to a creative 
problem solution. This is often referred to as the “Aha!” phenomenon-a burst 
of insight into the nature of a problem that leads immediately to a creative 
solution. Gestalt theory and Boden’s theory share an important underlying 
principle. Both theories claim that creative thought is distinguished from ordinary 
Fig. 1. The Necker cube. 
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problem solving by conceptual restructuring.’ Once redescription has occurred, 
the process of operationalizing that knowledge (using it to make a new, creative 
solution to a problem) is easy, or, at worst. no more difficult than simple problem 
solving. The hard part, Gestalt theorists would say, is in seeing the problem in a 
new light. After that, the solution is obvious. This thesis has been tested in 
various ways. These results are equally meaningful-and enlightening-in the 
context of Boden’s theory. 
The 9-dot problem is a famous “creativity” example used to illustrate Gestalt 
principles. In the 9-dot problem, a subject is given a square of 9 dots and asked to 
connect the dots using four straight lines without lifting his pencil from the paper 
(see Fig. 2). According to Gestalt theorists, the Y-dot problem is really very easy. 
The reason most people find the problem difficult is because they assume that 
their lines must stay inside the square formed by the 9 dots. Once they realize that 
the lines can go outside the square they experience a sudden restructuring of their 
knowledge and solving the problem becomes trivially easy. (Knowing this, the 
reader might want to try to solve the puzzle before going on. The solution is given 
at the end of this review in Fig. 4.) 
This claim can be tested in a straightforward way. If the difficulty in solving the 
9-dot problem lies in realizing that the lines can go outside the square, then giving 
subjects this knowledge should make solving the problem easy. Going outside the 
square should allow restructuring to occur, which in turn should make the 
problem solution obvious. 
Studies by Burnham and Davis [2] and Alba and Weisberg [l] tested this 
hypothesis and found no support for the claim that conceptual restructuring is the 
key element of creativity. In both studies, students were presented with a 9-dot 
problem and told that the only way to solve the problem was to go outside the 
square. Burnham and Davis told the subjects to go outside the square immedi- 
ately; Alba and Weisberg let the subjects work on the problem for a short time 
before giving the hint. Both studies produced similar results. Although all the 
subjects made use of the hint, only 20-25 percent of the subjects were able to 
solve the problem-and these subjects did not do so any more quickly or easily 
than subjects who did not receive the hint. Alba and Weisberg [l] tested subjects 
on other “insight” problems with similar results. These studies suggest that, 
. . . 
l . . 
. . . 
Fig. 2. The V-dot problem 
’ Gestalt theory and Boden’s theory differ primarily on how they explain the mechanism of conceptual 
restructuring. Gestalt psychologists believed that the same perceptual processes that led to perceptual 
restructurings such as the Necker cube were also responsible for the conceptual restructurings leading 
to creative problem solving, while Boden suggests that conceptual restructuring is accomplished by 
various non-perceptual cognitive processes. 
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contrary to the claims of Boden and Gestalt theory, restructuring of knowledge is 
not the key, enabling step of creativity. Rather, these studies suggest that 
restructuring knowledge may be easy compared to the task of operationalizing the 
new knowledge. 
One might object that the supplied hint in these studies is too vague, or that 
going outside the square is only the first of many restructurings needed to solve 
the 9-dot problem. But these objections serve only to dilute the Gestalt viewpoint 
to one that is progressively closer to traditional problem solving. The fundamental 
principle of these theories is that sudden restructuring of knowledge leads 
immediately and easily to a creative problem solution. If the restructuring of the 
problem or the use of the restructured knowledge is achieved by methodical, 
many-stepped problem solving, then there is no fundamental difference between 
these theories and traditional problem solving. 
In fact [l], [2] and other studies have led some psychologists to just this 
conclusion: that creativity is a progressive extension of ordinary problem-solving 
methods. There is substantial psychological evidence to indicate that creativity 
does not turn on an unusual, singular process such as conceptual restructuring, 
but is instead the result of conscious, incremental problem-solving processes. A 
summary of this theory as well as an extended discussion of the Gestalt theory are 
given in [14]. 
Apart from formal psychological evidence, Boden does offer anecdotal analyses 
of various famous creative episodes-from KekulC to Poincare-which seem to 
involve conceptual remapping. But these episodes might well be explained in 
other ways. Consider the famous incident involving Kekule, which Boden uses 
extensively in The Creative Mind as an example of conceptual remapping. Did the 
idea of circular organic molecule structures require Kekule to redescribe his 
internal conceputal representation of organic molecules? Or is there an alternate 
explanation? 
If we make the reasonable assumption that KekulC as a trained scientist had 
some elementary knowledge of geometry and topology, it follows that he must 
have had a conceptual representation that included the ability to represent 
circular structures. Given this, it would seem that Kekule’s breakthrough was not 
that he remapped his understanding of structures to include the previously 
unthinkable concept of circular structures, but rather his realization that a 
constraint about organic molecule structures (that they must be linear) could be 
profitably relaxed. 
Kekule’s discovery of the ring structure of organic molecules is particularly 
interesting because it has a parallel in the casebooks of artificial intelligence: the 
DENDRAL program [S]. The DENDRAL program was one of the first expert 
systems. Like Kekule, DENDRAL’s task domain was the elucidation of the 
structure of organic molecules. And like Kekule, DENDRAL initially understood 
only linear (acyclical) structures and was later expanded to understand ring 
structures. Unlike Kekule, DENDRAL was not a discovery system, and it did not 
invent the notion of ring structures. That knowledge was added to the system by 
the developers. So the parallel between DENDRAL and Kekule is not exact, and 
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it would be misleading to say that DENDRAL was creative. But one aspect of 
DENDRAL’s expansion to incorporate ring structures is striking. Although 
DENDRAL had the benefit of being developed long after organic ring structures 
were well understood, it still required enormous effort to add this knowledge to 
the DENDRAL program. Lederberg worked for years to develop an algorithm 
for generating cyclical structures; ten years passed before DENDRAL could be 
expanded from acyclical to cyclical ring structures. In DENDRAL. as in the 9-dot 
problem, the great effort came in the operationalization of new knowledge; not in 
the representational redescription that led to the new knowledge. The history of 
the DENDRAL project is described in detail in [9]; interested readers may wish 
to compare this to the accounts of Kekule’s work Boden presents. 
We must conclude that the psychological evidence for representational re- 
description as the source of creativity is at best mixed. The work on RRH is 
interesting but not yet tied directly to creativity. The psychological evidence for 
the Gestalt theory of creativity, which is similar in many ways to Boden’s theory 
of creativity, is largely negative. Other psychological work suggests other 
explanations for creativity. And anecdotal evidence from famous creative epi- 
sodes is easy to interpret in various ways. 
3.3. Consistenq 
Finally, we can examine Boden’s thesis on philosophical grounds. The crux of 
Boden’s thesis is that a creator must produce a new conceptual system that 
permits it to create concepts that it could not before. Is this a consistent and 
meaningful thesis? Does Boden apply this thesis consisently to examples of 
creativity from both humans and computers? 
Let us return to the example of Kekule. According to Boden’s thesis, in 
Kekule’s initial conceptual system, organic molecules could only be formed of 
linear strings of carbon atoms. To discover benzene’s ring form, Kekule had to 
discard his old conceptual system in favor of a new one which contained a 
previously impossible concept: ring-shaped organic molecules. Where did this new 
conceptual system come from? 
We must suppose that Kekule knew something about loops and topology 
independent of his understanding of organic molecules. Somehow Kekule applied 
this and other knowledge to create a new conceptual system, one that could 
produce the idea of ring-shaped organic molecules. This new conceptual system 
permitted Kekule to produce concepts that he couldn’t produce before. 
Or could he have? 
The difficulty here is one of levels. If we view Kekule on the level of a 
conceptual system for organic molecules, then it does appear that a fundamental 
change has occurred which permits Kekule to produce concepts that he couldn’t 
before. But if we step back a level and view KekulC as a whole, including not only 
his conceptual system for organic molecules, but also his knowledge of loops, 
geometry, and more, then it is apparent that the concepts which appeared 
impossible (ring-shaped organic molecules) were in fact implicit in the “Kekule 
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system”. Indeed, it seems silly to suggest hat a scientific researcher of Kekule’s 
stature couldn’t conceive of circular structures. The ring molecule wasn’t some- 
thing that KekulC couldn’t have thought of before-just something he didn’t think 
of before. 
This returns us to our alternative definition of creativity as a surprising 
discovery in a huge, trackless conceptual space. What makes Kekule’s creativity 
amazing is not that he produced thoughts that he couldn’t have before (because 
the possibility of those thoughts always existed) but that he picked a particular 
novel and useful solution out of the vast space of possible solutions implicit in the 
Kekule system. 
This difficulty of levels is particularly apparent in computer programs. Com- 
puter programs are much simpler and easier to analyze than people. Their 
knowledge-both explicit and implicit-is easier to comprehend. The closed 
boundaries of a computer program make it readily apparent that “conceptual 
remapping” must after all come from within the system in which it occurs: 
Anything produced by a computer must (barring hardware faults) have been 
generated by the computational principles built/programmed into it. [p, 401 
Suppose, for example, that I build a computer program to tell stories about King 
Arthur as a way of demonstrating how a computer can be creative in the domain 
of storytelling [12]. No matter what stories this program tells, no matter what 
concepts it invents during the course of storytelling, it will be possible for a person 
familar with the program to explain exactly how the program came up with each 
concept. What the program can do is implicit in its code. There is no real sense in 
which the program can at one point (eventually) do something that it couldn’t 
(eventually) do the moment before. 
Consequently, by Boden’s definition of creativity, it is impossible for a 
computer program to be truly creative. There is no way in which we can say that a 
particular concept was previously “impossible”, because we can trace in whatever 
detail necessary how that concept was computed. What arises is implicit in the 
machinery; it is the devil of determinism that lies at the heart of the modern 
computer. 
And although The Creative Mind focuses on how computers can illuminate our 
understanding of human creativity, Boden never fully addresses the issue of 
computer creativity. For example, of AM (which curiously receives only three 
pages of discussion) she says: 
In short, AM appears to be significantly P-creative, and slightly H-creative 
too. As with the Pappus-program, however, AM’s creativity can be properly 
assessed only by close examination of the way in which it works . . . . 
The precise extent of AM’s creativity, then, is unclear. [pp. 208-2091 
The “Pappus-program” referred to was an early theorem prover in the domain of 
elementary Euclidean geometry [3]. By exhaustive search, this program was able 
to come up with an unexpected and elegant proof that the base angles of an 
isosceles triangle are equal. Boden judges the creativity of this program by 
examining how the computer program achieved its proof: 
Unlike Pappus. the program did not transform its initial search-space in any 
way, not even by construction. Rather. it did something which shows that 
a result WC might have thought to lie only in some other conceptual 
space . could be reached by a thorough exploration of that one. [p. 1101 
The implication of the comparison of AM to the Pappus-program is that AM can 
be judged creative only if it transforms its problem space to produce new concepts 
that it could not have produced previously. But as we showed above with the 
“KekuE system”. any such transformations must necessarily be implicit in the 
system as a whole. So is AM more creative than the Pappus-program? Or is it 
simply more difficult to understand? 
Unfortunately, Boden does not apply her definition of creativity to computers 
as she does to people. In Chapter 1 she considers the question of whether or not 
computers can be ‘*really” creative, and concludes only that: 
For reasons explained in the final chapter, I would probably answer no to 
[this] question. Perhaps you would, too. However, this hypothetical moral 
decision-making about imaginary artificial creatures is irrelevant to our main 
purpose: understanding human creativity. [p. 1 l] 
Here 1 believe Boden to be mistaken. The question of whether or not computers 
can be creative is of great importance to our understanding of our own creativity. 
Indeed, there could hardly be any more important result from the study of 
creativity than a convincing reason why humans can be creative but computers 
not. If one accepts the naturalist view of “mind as computer”, then whether or 
not computers can in theory be creative is a pivotal question: if they cannot, then 
the human mind must be more than just a physical mechanism. Such a bold claim 
deserves frank discussion, and it is a serious shortcoming of The Creative Mind 
that Boden raises this issue but sidesteps any meaningful discussion of it. 
4. An example of a mechanism for computational creativity 
Many of the difficulties with Boden‘s definition of creativity are solved if 
representational redescription is viewed as one source of creativity within a 
problem-solving framework. Recent work in artificial intelligence [7, 10, 12, 151 
suggests a view of creativity in which this is possible. In this research problem 
solving is seen as the search of an explicit knowledge space for known solutions 
and creativity as the search of a vast. implicit knowledge space for new solutions. 
Creativity is distinguished from problem solving not by a single distinguished 
mechanism (i.e., representational redescription) but by the types of solutions it 
discovers: solutions incorporating knowledge not found by ordinary problem 
solving. The challenge for this model of creativity is to explain (1) how creativity 
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is integrated with problem solving, (2) how the creator’s vast implicit knowledge 
space can be searched for knowledge that will be useful in creating a new solution 
for a particular problem, and (3) how that knowledge, once found, can be applied 
to the original problem with reasonable effort. 
My own research [12] presents a model of creativity as an extension to problem 
solving. The fundamental principle of this model is that new problem solutions 
can be created by transforming a problem into a new problem, solving the new 
problem, and then adapting the solution back to the original problem. Problem 
transformations and the corresponding solutions are bundled together into 
knowledge structures called Transform-Recall-Adapt Methods (or TRAMS). 
The problem transformation enables the problem solver to find new knowledge 
via problems similar to the original problem; the corresponding adaptation 
enables the problem solver to apply this knowledge to create a new solution. 
Furthermore, this model provides an explicit mechanism by which a problem 
solver can perform the kinds of knowledge redescriptions needed to be creative. 
This model has been implemented in a computer program called MINSTREL and 
applied to problems in storytelling, planning, and mechanical device invention. 
In MINSTREL, each TRAM bundles a specific problem transformation with a 
corresponding solution adaptation. When problem solving fails, the problem 
solver applies a TRAM to the current problem. The Transform portion of the 
TRAM changes the current problem into a new problem. The Recall step tries to 
solve this new problem. If the Recall step is successful, the Adapt step adapts the 
recalled solution back to the original problem-using the adaptation knowledge 
bundled with the transformation method. 
For example, TRAM:Intention-Switch suggests that a new solution to a 
problem requiring an actor to do something intentionally can be found by (1) 
transforming the intentional result into an unintentional result, (2) recalling a 
solution to this problem, and then (3) adapting the recalled solution to the 
original problem by making the unintentional result intentional. MINSTREL uses 
this TRAM to solve the following problem: 
Johnneeds some quarters for the laundry machine. 
MINSTREL’s problem-solving component fails to find a solution to this problem, 
because the only solution MINSTREL knows for obtaining quarters (“Check the 
change jar”) fails. When problem solving fails, MINSTREL tries to invent a new 
solution by applying a TRAM. In this case, MINSTREL applies TRAM:Inten- 
tion-Switch. The Transform portion of TRAM:Intention-Switch replaces the 
intentional result (doing something in order to obtain quarters) with an uninten- 
tional result (doing something and unexpectedly obtaining quarters), creating in 
the new problem description: 
John does something andunexpectedly finds some quarters. 
This new problem description recalls a solution: 
One daywhile cleaning the couch, John found some quarters. 
156 S.R. Turner : Artificiul Intelligence 79 (1995) 145-159 
TRAM:Intention-Switch now adapts this recalled solution 
problem by changing the unintentional result to an intentional 
In order to obtain quarters. John cleaned the couch. 
for the original 
result: 
This results in the new (to MINSTREL) solution of obtaining quarters by looking 
for them in the couch. This process is shown graphically in Fig. 3. 
A problem solver who randomly encountered the idea of “couch cleaning” 
would probably have difficulty adapting it to the problem of finding quarters for 
the laundry. There might be any number of ways to adapt knowledge of couch 
cleaning to the problem of obtaining quarters. The problem-solver might reason 
that he could clean couches in his neighborhood in return for quarters, or that he 
could sell his vacuum cleaner. But because TRAM:Intention-Switch knows the 
problem transformation that led to this reminding, it does not have to search for 
an adaptation. The proper adaptation is bundled with the corresponding problem 
transformation. 
TRAMS have three advantages. First, by basing the search for new knowledge 
upon the original problem specification, TRAMS provide a starting point for the 
knowledge search and (because we assume that similar problems can have similar 
solutions) localizes the search to an area likely to have useful knowledge’ Second, 
the TRAM model eliminates the difficult task of adaptation by bundling a specific 
solution adaptation with each problem transformation. Finally, the TRAM model 
describes a mechanism for the redescription and transformation of knowledge 
Transform 
Initial John does something in 
R&lam order to possess some 
) John does something and unexpectedly 
possesses some quarters. 
quarters. 
cmaiad John cleans the couch in 
SdUYoa order to possess some +- John cleans the couch and finds 
quarters. some quarters. 
TRAM:Intention-Switch 
Comment: Look for an unintentional outcome instead of an intentional one. 
Transform: Change the intentional outcome to an unintentional outcome. 
Adapt: Change the unintentional outcome of the solution to an intentional 
outcome. 
Fig. 3. TRAM:Intention-Switch 
‘The question of how TRAMS can be used to discover new solutions involving knowledge distant 
from the original problem specification is answered hy applying several TRAMS sequentially (“Great 
leaps by many small steps”). See (121 for further discussion of this and other features of the TRAM 
model of creativity. 
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needed for creativity. Each TRAM represents a specific type of redescription of 
knowledge that can be applied to search for a new solution to a problem. For this 
review, I’ve purposely chosen to illustrate a simple TRAM, both to demonstrate 
how even a simple transformation can lead to a creative problem solution and to 
demonstrate how the TRAM model integrates creativity and problem-solving, but 
MINSTREL also implements more complex and powerful TRAMS. Currently 
MINSTREL has a library of twenty-four TRAMS that implement knowledge 
transformations which have traditionally been viewed as creative, such as 
relaxation, generalization and analogy. New methods are easily added. 
The TRAM model of creativity encompasses representational redescription as 
one source of creativity. But the point here is not to claim that TRAMS are the 
definitive mechanism for creativity, but instead to (1) show an example of a 
mechanism that implements creativity as the search for useful solutions in a vast, 
implicit knowledge space, (2) show how Boden’s model of creativity as repre- 
sentational redescription can be incorporated into this model of creativity, and (3) 
show how a model of creativity can be integrated into a model of problem solving. 
Boden’s model as a standalone explanation of creativity distinguished from 
problem solving has several problems, but these largely disappear when it is 
viewed as a component of a broader theory of creativity. Readers interested in 
further information about MINSTREL and other current AI models of creativity 
should obtain the Proceedings of the 1993 Spring Symposium on Creativity [17]. 
5. Conclusions 
Representational redescription may well be one of the mechanisms of human 
creativity. Certainly it appears that people have the ability to redescribe their 
concepts, and it seems plausible that this should at least sometimes lead to 
creative thoughts. But the thesis that representational redescription is the unique 
source of human creativity has several flaws. It does not explain many acts which 
we are accustomed to call creative, it disagrees with psychological evidence, and it 
rests upon an inconsistent understanding of what a cognitive system can compute. 
Psychological research and current work in AI models of creativity suggest a 
broader view of creativity in which a reasoner extends his problem-solving 
abilities with a variety of techniques for exploring a large, implicit knowledge 
space for new problem solutions. The wonder is not that the creator invents 
something that he couldn’t before, but that he finds something useful and novel in 
a vast space of possibilities. 
Because of these flaws in the representational redescription theory of human 
creativity, and because the book does not address important questions about 
computer creativity (particularly the question of whether computers can be 
creative), The Creative Mind cannot stand alone as a fundamental text in the area 
of computer creativity. Despite these problems, I recommend The Creative Mind 
for an interesting and thought-provoking look at many of the important issues in 
creativity. Although Boden’s approach has difficulties, she does make a serious 
1% S.R. Turner 1 Artificiul Intelligence 74, (19%) 14.5-159 
0 0 
Fig. J. %dot problem solution. 
attempt to provide concrete, understandable answers to many of the important 
questions of creativity, and this by itself should prove enlightening to the reader. 
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